

# FOREIGN POLICY BULLETIN

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## UN Chalks Up Successes Despite Power Rivalries

As the fourth session of the UN General Assembly, now meeting at Flushing, New York, moves toward its scheduled adjournment early in December, a number of disputes on its agenda appear to be on the verge of settlement.

### Progress Reported

1. Greatest progress was recorded on the *Indonesian question* with the successful termination of The Hague Round Table Conference on November 2, in which the UN Commission for Indonesia played a significant role.\*

2. In *Palestine* both Arabs and Israelis are cooperating in the implementation of the UN-sponsored truce agreements and are reported looking to the UN Clapp committee for positive aid in resolving the refugee problem. There has also been talk of directly negotiated peace agreements with Israel, starting with Jordan which wants to regularize its control over Arab Palestine.

3. In *Greece* the Communist guerrillas, having lost the support of Yugoslavia, have declined in strength. Nevertheless the Assembly's Political Committee on November 4 voted 38 to 6 to continue its watchdog committee and called on UN members to impose an arms embargo against Albania and Bulgaria to prevent them from aiding the guerrillas.

4. The fate of the *former Italian colonies* neared decision when the Assembly's Political Committee voted on November 12 to give Libya its independence "as soon as possible," with January 1, 1952 as a

deadline, and to grant Italy a trusteeship over Somaliland on condition that the area be freed in ten years and subject, in the interim, to a three-power advisory council composed of Egypt, the Philippines and Colombia. Disagreement between advocates of independence for Eritrea—led by Italy—and advocates of Eritrea's partition between Ethiopia and the Sudan brought acceptance of a plan for a commission, including South Africa, Guatemala, Norway, Burma and Pakistan, to ascertain the wishes of the Eritreans and report next year.

### How to Strengthen UN?

In each of these cases the UN has functioned primarily as an advisory body and as a focus for world public opinion, with progress toward settlement attributable in large part to compromises by, or changes in the attitude of, interested parties. A notable exception in the case of the former Italian colonies provided the basis for a suggestion made by Secretary of State Dean Acheson at the opening of the General Assembly that in other cases also the disputants might bind themselves in advance to accept the decision of the General Assembly or the Security Council—or, on points of law, the International Court.

Another proposal for strengthening the UN grew out of the assassination of Count Folke Bernadotte on September 17, 1948 and the failure of the Big Five to reach agreement in the UN Military Committee on the terms of an international military force. Secretary General Trygve Lie requested the establishment of a small

field force, a suggestion approved by the Assembly's Special Political Committee on October 27. This force could not carry out an enforcement action—especially as it was reduced from Mr. Lie's proposed 5,000 men to a maximum of 300 "persons"—but it establishes a precedent and may enable UN agencies to operate with more confidence. Procedural changes adopted by the General Assembly on October 22 and committee approval on November 8 of a move to reduce the proliferation of committees and red tape represent further attempts to strengthen the UN within its present framework.

### State Sovereignty

These steps failed, however, to strike at the basic weakness of the UN which stems from its character as a league of sovereign nationalist states, a weakness tragically demonstrated by the inability of the world's superpowers to agree on most international issues. Yugoslavia's successful bid for a seat on the Security Council, the Chinese and Korean questions, and the problem of controlling atomic weapons pose critical issues which threaten to exacerbate the cold war in the UN.

Proposals have been made to rectify this situation by reducing the use of the veto in the Security Council. On November 4 the Assembly's Special Political Committee asked the International Court whether the General Assembly could admit a state to UN membership without a recommendation from the Security Council if the failure to recommend was due to a veto. Such a step, if authorized, would by-pass one repeated application of the veto power

\*See *Foreign Policy Bulletin*, November 11, 1949.

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—of Russia's 41 vetoes, 23 have concerned new members.

Until the great powers can agree among themselves, however, changes in the veto will probably not materially strengthen the UN. Accordingly observers have welcomed any signs of great power cooperation during the current Assembly session. The proposal of Soviet Foreign Minister Andrei Vishinsky on September 23 for a five power "pact for the strengthening of peace," coupled with a condemnation of Western "war propaganda," was rejected on November 14 by Warren R. Austin, permanent United States delegate to the UN, as an "attempt to slander, obstruct and deceive." Instead, Mr. Austin sub-

mitted a resolution on "essentials of peace" calling on all nations to observe the basic principles of the Charter and on the Big Five to broaden their cooperation and restrict their use of the veto.

That an undertaking to revive the unanimity principle had already been reached was intimated by Mr. Austin on October 22 before the Buffalo Council on World Affairs. The principle was tested in the Assembly's Economic and Financial Committee where several decisions were taken unanimously on the Soviet-sponsored full employment resolution. In its final form, however, the resolution was opposed by the Soviet bloc when it passed the committee 39 to 5 on November 3.

Atomic energy control affords a basic test of the willingness of the great powers to agree. After an acrimonious debate the Assembly's Special Political Committee on November 14 approved a resolution calling for an agreement "to limit the individual exercise of" sovereignty in relation to atomic energy, and for a renewal of discussions by the six permanent members of the UN Atomic Energy Commission—the Big Five plus Canada. The future strengthening of the UN continues to depend on the ability of the great powers to agree.

FRED W. RIGGS

*(The second of two articles on the fourth session of the United Nations General Assembly.)*

## ***Real Obstacles Hamper Britain's Union with Europe***

American haste in pressing for Western European "integration" has proved embarrassing for Britain and may even backfire by intensifying Anglo-French disputes in the various organizations established to foster European unity. A hint of this possibility emerged from the meeting of the United States, French and British Foreign Ministers in Paris on November 9-10 when M. Robert Schuman, speaking for a cabinet only a little more than two weeks old, found himself agreeing to support the "progressive integration of the German people into the European community." Thus, by accident or design; Foreign Secretary Ernest Bevin, who had taken the initiative in calling the conference, succeeded in emphasizing one of the implications of closer economic and political ties on the continent which may prove unpopular in France.

### ***Rebuff from Cripps***

When Economic Cooperation Administrator Paul G. Hoffman addressed the council of the Organization for European Economic Cooperation in Paris on October 31, he used the word "integration" fifteen times. He said in effect that if the Marshall Plan countries, with their population of 270 million, could achieve the economic unity of the United States they would constitute a mass market which might be expected to develop industrial efficiency of American standards. The next day Britain's Chancellor of the Exchequer, Sir Stafford Cripps, stressed Britain's obligations to the Commonwealth and the sterling area and promised only external help for "other OEEC countries" if they should adopt "schemes

for closed economic integration . . . into which we do not enter."

As a result, American observers have increasingly referred to British "aloofness" and even to the "splendid isolation" with which Canning regarded the continent in the post-Napoleonic era. Yet it would be a mistake to assume that Britain is indifferent to the problems and challenge of European unity or that it has been singularly laggard in promoting certain aspects of greater integration. From Churchill's offer of union with France in 1940 to Bevin's grasping "with both hands" of Washington's original proposal for the Marshall Plan in June 1947, British leaders on official and unofficial levels have given a great deal of serious consideration to the economic, political and military facets of cooperation with the continent. The sum total of this study has been the conclusion that Europeans are divided into separate sovereign units today not merely because of petty bickering among themselves but because of real and sturdy barriers which are not likely to be removed in a few short years.

Where the British have perhaps gone farthest toward integration is in the realm of European defense, largely because such steps are in line with their geographical position, their traditional foreign policy and their assessment of the present situation. Britain's historic policy of preventing the domination of the continent by an aggressive foreign power is well recognized by members of the Commonwealth, which have entered two world wars in support of this concept.

The British realize that today military strength depends more than ever on

economic strength, but it is on questions of economic union that their greatest reservations arise. They point out that steps toward integration which diverted some strategic production from the British Isles to the continent would be a weakening factor as long as Europe remains vulnerable to the occupation of mass armies. Here their beliefs are colored by the fact that Britain alone in Europe thwarted a Nazi invasion in World War II.

Aside from considerations of strength, the British are inclined to challenge Mr. Hoffman's premise on its own grounds. *The Manchester Guardian* on November 1 commented: "While the United States was a single market before modern industry was established, it would be a very different matter to make one market of Western Europe when her industries have so far developed separately." A study group of the Royal Institute of International Affairs attributed the economic predominance of the United States "in the first instance to unrivalled natural resources, not only an acreage of cultivable land far exceeding what is necessary to supply the whole population, but abundant mineral resources, including besides metallic ores and oil, coal seams of exceptional productivity."\*

Under the circumstances, many British observers believe that an integration of the Commonwealth, with its present and potential resources for the production of food and raw materials, holds more promise for Britain's economic salvation. More-

\*Reported by R. G. Hawtrey in *Western European Union: Implications for the United Kingdom*, London, Royal Institute of International Affairs, 1949.

over, they contend that the Commonwealth's system of imperial preferential tariffs, a joint program which neither Britain nor the dominions are likely to sacrifice, all but rules out the United Kingdom's participation in a European customs union.

### **Political Questions**

But it is where politics and economics meet that the knottiest issues of West European integration arise. The Labor government is politically committed to the maintenance of full employment through planning. Spokesmen for the Labor party, when their attention is called to the "recovery" of Belgium, for instance, con-

tinually point to the unemployment which has attended the reduction of economic controls. Some of them would integrate Britain with the continent only if the continent would accept a greater measure of planning, but they recognize that the kind of political unity necessary for British austerity is lacking in France and Italy. They fear that "integration" would mean the introduction of continental chaos into Britain's economy without solving its dollar deficit, thus giving it the worst of both worlds. They believe that they, more than the other nations of Europe, are working along the right lines to achieve greater dollar capacity, and they want more time to see their planning con-

vert the newly adopted measure of devaluation into an effective policy.

These are only a few of the considerations which make Britain reluctant to accept wholeheartedly the American program for integration. When Britain's difficulties are compounded by those confronting the continental nations, it is likely that they will constitute a formidable array of obstacles. This prospect is bound to prove disappointing to both Congress and the American public, particularly if we are led to expect the birth by 1952 of a United States of Europe created in our own image.

WILLIAM W. WADE

## **Colombian Strife Epitomizes Latin American Crisis**

With the inexorability of action in a Greek tragedy Colombia in the past six months has been moving toward a dictatorship of the extreme Right, a development climaxed on November 9 by the Conservative government's imposition of martial law throughout the country. Since last May, at least, Colombia has been in the throes of an undeclared civil war inspired by the failure of President Mariano Ospina Pérez' bipartisan government. Actually the trouble can be traced to the 1946 division within the Liberal party itself, punctuated by the assassination of its leader, Jorge Eliécer Gaitán, on "Black Friday" in April 1948 and to resulting deep-seated tensions in this South American country.

### **Liberal Party Split**

Colombia's corrugated terrain may ultimately be held responsible for the breakdown of the Liberal-Conservative coalition, which, according to one estimate, has caused 10,000 casualties in the three years of the Ospina Pérez administration. In the last century, fanatic regionalism, induced by mountain barriers which only the airplane has been able to surmount, forced a compromise on the issue of centralism versus federalism. Colombia adopted a government distinguished by unusual political centralization and equally marked administrative decentralization. This formula gave the nation peace from 1886 on; it also put a premium on party control of local electoral machinery and the presidential power to appoint departmental governors who in turn appoint local mayors.

These perquisites have been hotly dis-

puted by Colombia's traditional parties, the landowning, clerical Conservative party, and the Liberal party which during its long tenure in office (1934-1946) gave the country a "New Deal" government. The 1946 presidential elections, however, found the party divided along right and left lines into two intransigent groups.\* This suicidal division assured the victory of the Conservative party candidate, Dr. Mariano Ospina Pérez, but the Liberals had a majority in Congress. Accordingly the "orthodox" Liberals and Ospina Pérez agreed to collaborate in a government of "National Union," dividing cabinet posts and governorships equally among the two parties.

This arrangement might have worked if the victories of supporters of Gaitán, the left-wing Liberal leader, in the 1947 congressional elections had not induced the Liberal party as a whole to accept him as their leader. This selection, in turn, gave control of the Conservative party to its most reactionary elements, notably Laureano Gómez. An ardent Hispanophile, Gómez, has created a black-shirt movement which fifteen years ago was a target of ridicule in Bogotá. He was black-listed by the Allies in the last war. These events drove moderates in both parties farther apart, and the Liberals' Jekyll and Hyde role in the cabinet and in Congress became increasingly difficult to maintain. The assassination of Gaitán, the subsequent riots, and the mutual assignment of blame for those events, effectively put an end to the alliance, although the Liberals, now solidly united behind moderate

Dario Echandía, former Minister of the Interior, did not leave the cabinet until May 22 of this year.

### **Undeclared Civil War**

As the time neared for congressional elections in June 1949 and presidential elections in 1950, the most acute issue between the two parties became that of adequate guarantees for a fair decision. Clashes between armed partisans, particularly in the mountainous districts of Boyacá and Santander, were by this time almost daily occurrences. Whole villages were at war with each other—the Liberals invading localities where the Conservatives had a majority, and the Conservatives attacking areas where Liberals were in the lead—burning houses, driving off cattle and causing thousands to flee to more secure areas or into Venezuela. In the partisan press, the Liberals advanced evidence showing that their opponents have had the active support of police shock troops, and even of army units, while Conservatives stressed the theme of Communist instigation which, in their view, had accounted for the April 1948 disorders. Although the Liberal party managed to retain a majority in the June 5 elections for the national Chamber of Deputies, its decreasing lead appeared to indicate that time was on the side of the Conservatives. Accordingly, the party sought, first, to push the date of the presidential elections forward from June 1950 to November 27, 1949, and, secondly, to secure re-registration of all voters, along the lines recommended by a Canadian technical mission, as well as to give persons who have been displaced by the "terror" the right to vote

\*See *Foreign Policy Bulletin*, April 16, 1948.



at their current places of residence. Their command of Congress enabled the Liberals to enact legislation to this effect. The electoral reform law passed on August 30, 1949 (with the Conservatives abstaining) was promptly vetoed by President Ospina Pérez as "unconstitutional," but was re-passed by both Chambers of Congress, and upheld by the Supreme Court of Colombia—where the Liberals had the majority—by a vote of 10 to 6 on September 23. By this time, however, the increasing belligerency of the Conservative party, coupled with the widespread refusal of local authorities to cooperate in the registration made the Liberals waver in the project for early elections.

As their enthusiasm waned, the determination of the Conservatives to accept the "Liberal challenge" at the polls increased, even if it should be necessary, in the words of Laureano Gómez, "to substitute violence for the revision of the electoral census." This leader was called back from Spain where he had gone in a self-imposed exile after the murder of Gaitán—to which Liberals believed he was an accessory—and on October 1 was selected as the "government candidate" for the presidency. His nomination, according to the Liberal party, sealed the defeat of the moderate elements in the Conservative leadership. This opinion was underscored when the Minister of War, General Rafael Sánchez Amaya, was suddenly ordered on an unexplained mission to the United States on October 9. His visit to this country coincided with news that a large consignment of arms had been ordered here for shipment to Colombia. Interim charge of his Ministry was given to Minister of the Interior Luís Ignacio Andrade, business partner of Gómez, who thereby now controls the army as well as the police. From this point forward emotions replaced reason on both sides. Before the Liberal parliamentary group could take action on its threat to impeach Ospina Pérez, the Colombian president declared a state of siege throughout the nation; ordered troops to occupy Congress and other government buildings, imposed censorship and a curfew, and arbitrarily notified the Supreme Court that hereafter its decisions would have to be taken by a two-thirds majority, instead of the statu-

tory simple majority.

If the elections are held as scheduled on November 27 under these restrictive conditions—and thus far there has been no announcement to the contrary—a Conservative victory is a foregone conclusion. The appearance of a single-party dictatorship in Colombia will signify another defeat in Latin America not for the party system alone but also for the compromise formula of coalition government which many Latin American publicists—Colombian Liberals among them—have advocated as the only way in which to reconcile political differences. If the Falangist Gómez faction remains dominant in a Conservative party dictatorship, its victory in Colombia will add another Latin American government to the mounting number of countries that have joined the new Madrid-Buenos Aires "axis" and increase the pressures on those few remaining nations which are struggling to retain a middle-of-the-road system.

OLIVE HOLMES

### France's Post-War Role

What part will France play in a reconstructed Europe, where Germany is reviving, and Britain remains cool to elaborate plans for continental union? To what extent do France and Italy work together in European and world affairs? READ two timely *Foreign Policy Reports* by Fred W. Riggs:

FRANCE AND ITALY: PARTNERS IN A NEW EUROPE?, October 15, 1949.

ROLE OF FRANCE AND ITALY ON THE WORLD STAGE, November 1, 1949.

Single copies, 25c.; subscriptions \$5; to FPA members, \$4.

### Branch and Affiliate Meetings

\*NEW YORK, November 22, *Arms for Europe*, George Fielding Eliot, James P. Warburg

\*UTICA, November 22, *The New Battle for Germany*, Delbert Clark

\*PHILADELPHIA, November 25, *Luncheon in honor of Her Excellency Madame Vijaya Lakshmi Pandit*

\*CLEVELAND, November 30, *Communism in China*, Harold Isaacs

\*Data taken from printed announcement

## News in the Making

FERMENT IN POLAND: The expulsion by the Polish United Workers' (Communist) party of three leading Communists from the party's Central Committee, announced on November 14, climaxes internal conflicts that have been developing for over a year. Among those expelled was Wladyslaw Gomulka, former Deputy Premier, who had been deposed in 1948 because of alleged nationalist tendencies. The appointment of the Soviet military commander Konstantin K. Rokossovsky as Marshal of Poland and Polish Minister of National Defense (he was also appointed to the Communist party's Central Committee), was interpreted abroad both as an attempt to bolster the East against Germany, possibly with a view to eventual withdrawal of Russian troops from the East German state, and as a measure to check Polish trends toward "Titoism."

PHILIPPINE ELECTIONS: The Liberal party of pro-United States President Elpidio Quirino, despite some outbreaks of violence at the polls, received a decisive majority in the national elections held on November 8, defeating both the anti-United States Nationalist party of José P. Laurel and the secessionist Liberals led by former Senate President José Avelino. The President is expected to face difficulties in getting the lame-duck Congress which reconvenes on December 9 to approve appropriations for the remainder of 1949. When the new Congress meets in January, however, Mr. Quirino's supporters will control about two-thirds of the seats in the House of Representatives and a safe majority in the Senate.

A PEACE TREATY FOR JAPAN?: Amid rumors that Washington is drafting a peace treaty for Japan, President Truman on November 11 agreed to relieve Major General Frank R. McCoy, retired, former president of the Foreign Policy Association, as United States representative on the Far Eastern Commission. General McCoy's successor is Maxwell M. Hamilton, a career foreign service officer now attached to the Office of Far Eastern Affairs in the State Department, who will hold the rank of ambassador.